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ADDRESS

DELIVERED

BY

JESSE

W 0 CARTER

BEFORE

THE

OF SAN FRANCISCO ON FEBRUARYTHE 10TH, 1954,

LA WYERS f

CLUB

IN THE COMSTOCK

ROOMOF THE PALACE HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ENTITLED
"RECENT TREND IN COURTDECISIONS IN CALIFORNIAo "
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discussion
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at

to be opened for

stability

not

Stephen J.

assert

the

law is

the l~esult
of mankind,

the 1ndividual
It

1s poss1..ble

that some intellects may rise to the percept10n of absolute
truth, and be justified in questioning the general judgment of
the learned of mankind.

But before the legitimate and just

inference arising from the general acquiescence of' the learned
can be avoided, the error in the principles recognized should
be clearly shown.

We should not blindly adhere to precedents,

nor should we more blindly abandon them as guides."
thought expressed by Justice Field in the
foregoing excerpt was epitomized by Lord Hardwicke nearly 200
years ago in these words:

"Certainty is the mother of repose;

therefore, the law aims at certainty.
If these concepts were dominant in the format1on of
court deciSions there would obviously be more unanim1ty and less
conflicts, and there would be no occaSion to talk about trends
1n court decisions.

But judges are human beings and their

thinking is influenced by their backgrounds of education, train1ng and
associations, past and present.

It cannot_ be denied that these

are times of conflicting SOCial, economic and political

, and the

t

philosophies is

the exeoutive and legislative
the judicial branch as well.

t not only

of our government but by

We quite orten hear the words "liberal."

"conservative," flreactionary/l"

tt

mlddle-ot-the-road,ft "left," "right. 1t

These terms are all as equally applicable to JUdges as they are to
those in the executive and legislative branches of our government.
Who answers a partloular deSignation may
conflict but there seems to be pretty
application.

the subject of SOme
agreement in their

Holmes was said to be a liberal in civil rights cases

and in cases involving the right of the people through their
legislatures to experiment In attemptlng to solve social and
economic ills, and many of h1.8 greatest dissents \'lere In these
fields, while in some other fields he was considered a conservatlve.
S cudents of history recogn'.ze that the trend of court
decisions is influenced by the polnt of view of the majority on the
major Issues of the times.

The number and character of the dissents

depend upon the abilit¥l-_convlctlons and industry of the minority.
In some of my dissents, I have referred to the trend of deciSion
the Supreme C'Jurt of Californla during the last few years.

of

this trend bas

decidedly reactionary.

This statement is made advisedly and is based upon numerous
recent decisions rendered by a majority of the Supreme Court of
California in which the court has. by a non-liberal construction
of the Constitution and laws of this state, denied lit1gants
rights to which they were ent1tled.
To be more specific. the Supreme Court of California
has by a series of decisions during the past two or three years
stricken down the remedial provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act designed to protect employees who suffer
industrial injuries as a result of the ser10us and w1lful
misconduct of their employers.

I recently stated 1n one of cay

dissents in these cases that by its recent decisions in this
field the Supreme Court of California had wiped out forty years
of progress in nullIfying, by interpretation, a statute which
was designed to bring social justice to the working men and
women of'this state..

Iamona of· those who can remember the

plight of the injured workman before the Workmen's Compensat1on
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Act was adopted.

It is now a matter of h1story that the ad9Pt1on

of the Act by

of Californla was

J fought

by employer groups, and after its adoption it ran the gamut of
adverse court decisions for many years.

It might be of interest

at this pOint to quote from the biennial message of Governor
Hiram W. Johnsonl to the Legislature of California in 1917 1n
which he reviewed the incidents leading up to the adoption and
early period of the operation of th1s Act.

He sald:

tiThe new

philosophy of government, which has obtained in Californ1a had
its best and most sharply defined demonstrat1on 1n the workmen's
compensat1on law.

In 1911, we stood at the threshold of a great

unexplored governmental field.

Behind us were the hum1l1atl~n

and shame of thirty years of exploited
adm1nistered for a few.

governmen~,

cyn1cally

With hope in democracy renewed by the

first experience with the direct primary, with undefined, yet
certain knowledge of democracy's obligations, we turned
old sordid materialism, and looked

~

the greater promise of

1 1917 senate Journal 14 at 19, et seq.

~-

~rom

the

actIvIty for humanIty itself.

We entered falteringly

unexplored field l and then.our steps grew firm and our vision
broad, and today no commonwealth has gone farther or built
better for humanity.
"Those who believed that industry should bear the
burd~n

of its accidents, that its maimed and its injured should

not be cast forever upon the scrap heap of humanity, were
tirelessly seeking a legal remedy.

It was realized that the

frightful burden of accident should not be wholly upon
least able to bear it, but the path to relief through the
intricate mazes of the law was d1ff1cult to find.

The legislature

of 1911 adopted an elective law which, though not wholly effective
afforded opportunity for an educational propaganda and a thorough
investigation.
"The first Industrial Accident CommisSion, consisting
of A. J. P1llsbury, Will J. French and Willis I. Morrison,
prepared an e1ahorateworkmen's compensation law which was
presented to the legislature 1n 1913, was duly adopted, and
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became operative January 1, 1914.

While this law was pending

and before it had undergone the actual test of administration,
it was the center ot perhaps the bitterest contest that has
been waged over any enactment of recent years.

And out of all

the bitterness and abuse and denunciation of that contest which may
come to you who are now assuming legislative duties, is the
lesson that must ever be learned by him who would fearlessly
represent those who have entrusted him with power.

Every day,

during the session of 1913, all those newspapers of the State
ot California which have ever been opposed to any sort of
social justice, published page after page, not alone of
so-called conservatIve argument against the 'corroding
socialIsm' ot the state government, but of the foulest abuse of
every Indiv1dual advocating the law.

To pub11c scorn and

ridicule and contumely we were held up as 'destroyers ot industry,
'looters of bus1ness,' 'tra1tors to the state,' 'arrant demagogues
panderIng to the worst

~l~ments

law nevertheless passed.

of
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Butte Canal Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 40 Cal.2d 139; cal.-,
Western etc. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 39 Calo2d 104;
i
Fireman's
Fund etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 39 Cal.2d 529;
Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 39 Cal.2d 512; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 38 Cal.2d 599; CaliforniaWestern States Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 38 Cal.2d 880;Bryant
v. Industrial
Acc. Com., 37 Ca1o2d 215; Cal~ ShipbuildingCorp.
v. Ind. Acc. Com.~ 31 Calo2d 278; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.
v. Ind. Acc. Com., 30 Ca1o2d 388; Pacific
Freight
Lines v. Ind.
Acc.Com-.,-26
Calo2d 234; GCJ.rcla v. Industrial
Accident Com..

40 A.Co 7050
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California has ignored th1s rule by the s1mple process of
arbitrar1ly disregarding the determInation ot the tr1er of fact
and

ho1dlng~

as a matter of law, that the evIdence supporting

such determination was insuff1cient.

In one recent case (Gray

v. Brinkerhoff, 41 A.C. 183), however, the major1ty cited the
cases wh1ch established the reasonable minds rule and then
m1sstated the rule and refused to apply the correct rule to the
case.

In that case the major1ty stated:

"Whether or not

defendant was gu11ty of neg11gence or plaintiff was guilty of
•

contributory negligence is ordinarily a questIon of mixed fact
and law and may be determined as a matter of law only if
reasonable men

followin~

the law can draw but one conclusion

from the evIdence presented."

(EmphasIs addedo)

In that case,

the majority reversed a unanimous jury verd1ct approved by the
trial court on a motion for a new trial and affirmed by a

oakdale Union etc. School Dist., 40 Ca1.2d 207; Burtis v.
Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 40 Ca1.2d 823; Kurlan v. Columb1a
Broadcasting System. 40 Cal.2d799;· \oJeitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40
C~lo2d 778; Turner v. Mellon, 41 A.C. 44; Barrett v. City of
Claremont, 41 A.C. 69; Estate of Llng~nfelter, 38 Calo2d 5710
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trict Court ot

ion
reversal was

on the sole ground of

evidence to aupport the verdict.

of the

The undeniable implication of

this decision 18 that the twelve Jurors, the trial judge and the
three members of the distr1ct court, as well as I, who did not
agree with the majority, could not be classified as "reasonable
men following the law." In

other words, the view of the majority

was that they themselves were the only "reasonable men follow1ng
the law" who had participated in that case.

In this case I

might add that the verdict was in favor of the defendant.
I was engaged 1n the active pract1ce of law for over
twenty-six years before I became a member of the Supreme
of California.

Cour~

I participated in the trial of over a thousand

cases; over three hundred of these cases reached·the appellate
or Supreme Court on appeal and in none of these cases was a
decision of the appellate or Supreme Court based on the
insufflcl enc y of the evidence to support the deciaion of the
trial court or jury.

In those days lawyers felt, and had a
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by the trier
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, or

UrllColnt r

..u . f~'

of
maintain that
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majority of the Supreme
decisions.

ruthle8s1~

t.

I

by a

of California in many recent

In my opinion this trend ot decision not only

not advance the science of jurisprudence or aid in the
administration of Justice but
these objectives.

a serious impediment to

of

Aside from the inabilIty of an appellate

court to determine from the cold record the credibility of
witnesses or the weight of the evidence, it has the effect of
placing an undue burden on the members of the Supreme Court
whose sole duty 1s to decide questions of law based upon the
factual determination of the trier of fact
In a book entitled "Trial Judge," by Justice Bernard
Botein (Simon & Schuster, 1952), the author states at page 131:

"A major reason for a trial judge'S concern about his
decLal_ona J.n _nQnjuryproc.eedings is tha-t an appellate court
will rarely disturb his determination of the factso

ThIs

stamps the trial jud.ge's
"The
of

with a
the

•

, which

ot the unsound ..
final packaging ot the remaining ingredients at the

ot

trial court production line, are almost exclusively the
funct10n of the tr1al judge or jury.

The package may be labeled

judgment for plaintiff or defendant.
"Seldom mayan
f1nd1ngs.

te court change or

such

It may dec1de that on the facts as found 1n the

tr1al court, the law was misapplied or m1sunderstood, so that
the verd1ct or decision went tn favor ot the wrong

•

In

that event they may say, 'We've looked into the package and
th1nk you've put the wrong label on it.

We won't d1sturb the

contents ot your package, but we're go1ng to change the label
so that it will read 1n favor ot the other party.'
"The appellate court may also decide that the trial
judge adm1tted improper ev1dence or excluded-proper evidence
or that he instructed the jury erroneously.
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Then it may

reverse the verdict or decision, and send the case back to
tr1ed anew.

i

b~

It then says 1n effect to the trial court# qWe

have

ot

contains certa1n harmful substances.'

, and

that1t

Or, 'We f1nd that you

out certaIn IngredIents which, 1n

publio

feel should have been included to ensure the pur1ty of your
product.

We are

that you process it once more, in accordance w1th the formula
we are now giving you.

i "

Another respect in which recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of California have retarded the administration of
justice 1s by curtailing the po\,ler of a trial Judge 1n granti*1!
a mot1on for a new trial on limited issues.

For many years

sect10n 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure has provided that
the trial court may grant a mot1on for a new trial on part of
the 1ssues onlYG

Up until about a year and a half ago most o~

trial Judge had the power to grant a motion for a
new trial on the issue of damages only in

16-

evidence.
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excessive
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disturbed

in the absence

abuse or d1scret1on.4
as to an order

granting

and that

his

ruling

of a gross,

manifest

The same rule
a new trial

would

not

be

and unmistakable

was applied
on the

were either

to

such an order

insufficiency

of

the

But in August or 1952 the Supreme Court or California
held
grant

that

it

was an abuse of discretion

a new trial

in a personal

injury

for
action

a trial
on the

court
issue

to
of

4 Hicks

v. Ocean Shore Railroad,
Inc.
18 Calo2d 773
[117 P.2d 850]; Estate of Everts,
163 Cal. 449 t125 P. 1059];
Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d
217 [148 P.2d 680];
People ex
rel.
Dept. of Public Works v. McCullough~ 100 CaloApPo2d 101
(223 P.2d 37]; Ona v. Reachi~ 105 Cal.App.2d
758 [233 P.2d 949];
County of Los Angeles vo Bitterg
103 Cal.A~p.2d
385 [229 P02d
466]; Perry vo Fowler,
102 Ca10App.2d 808 l229 P.2d 46];
Parka
v. Dexter,
100 Cal.App.2d
521 [224 P.2d 121]; J. Levin Co. v.
Sherwood & Sherwood, 55 CaloApp.
308 [203 P. 404]; Rigal1
Vo
I~ew1B, 1 Cal~App.2d 737 [37 P.2d 97]; Spencer V. Nelson.
84
Cal.App.2d
61 [ 190 P.2d 40]; Wold v. League of the Cross.
107
Cal.App.
344 [290 Po 460); Amore v. Di Resta, 125 Cal.Appo
410 [13 P.2d 986]; Johnstone v. Johnson, 38 CaloAp~o2d 700 [102
P.2d 374]; Adams v. Hildebrand,
51 Cal.ApPo2d 117 (124 P.2d80).
Crandall
v. McGrath, 51 Cal.App.2d
438 [124 P.2d 858);
Bauman v. San Francisco.
42 Cal.App.2d
144 [108 P.2d 989];
Pacific
Telo & Telo Co. v. Wellman, 98 CaloApp.2d 151 [219 P.2d
506]; TUmelty v. Peerless Stagps,
96 CaloApp.
530 [~4 P. 430];
Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises
Inc.,
49 Cal.ApPo2d 383 [121

P.2d 829]; McNear v. Pacific
Greyhound Lines, 03 Cal.App.2d
11 [146 P.2d 34); Henslee v. Fox, 25 Ca1.App.2d 286 [77 P.2d
307); ~e11er v. Reid, 26 CaloApp.2d 421 [79 P.2d 449]; Martin
v. Donohue,
30 Ca1.APPo2d
County.
40 CaloApp.2d
298

80 Ca1.APPo2d
910 [212 P.2d

123
12];

219
[104

[85 P.2d 913];
Ohran
Vo Yolo
P.2d 700];
Tomell
'vo Munson,

[181 Po2d 112};
Woods v. Eitze.
94 Cal.ApPo2d
Tripcevich
Vo Compton.
25 CaloApPo2d
188

[77 Po2d 286]0
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damages only where the damages awarded by a

JU~J

were

inadequate 5 This holding was made in four personal inju~J
0

cases where the evIdence both as to liability and damages was
conf11ct1ngo

The theory of the majorIty opinions in these

cases seemed to be that the jury compromised the issue of
liabil1ty 1n favor of the plaInt1ff w1th the understanding that
a small amount of damages would be awarded, and that it

~iaS

therefore unjust to the defendant for the case to be retried
on the issue of damages onlyo

In one of these cases the court

squarely held that the Issues of liabIlity and damages were so
1nterwoven that a just conclus1on could not be reached with
respect to the Issue of damages w1thout retryIng the issue of
l1ab111tyo

Th1s holding was clearly contrary to the holding of

th1s same Supreme Court in Fuentes Vo Tucker, 31 Calo2d 1,
decided in

1947~

where it was held that the issues of liability

and damages 1n personal injury actions were entIrely separate

5 Leipert Va Honold, 39 Calo2d 462; Rose Vo Melody
Lane, 39 Cal02d 481; Cary Vo Wentzel, 39 Calo2d 491; Hamasaki
Va Flotho, 39 Calo2d 6020
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t

liabilIty i8

it is eI-l!"Ol!" to

by
lIabilIty over

defendant's objectIon.

There can be no

tion but that the effect ot the

holdIng ot the SupI"eme Court

the

Leipert~

Rose,

HamasakI cases is to depI-ive the trial COUI-t ot poweI- to gI-ant
a new trial in a personal Injury actIon on'
only, where the damages awarded by the jury are obviously
inadequate, and to require a re-trial on allot the issues even
though it is obvious to the trial court and to everyone
connected with the case that there is little or no doubt as t9
the lIabilIty of the defendant.

Thus. so far as this type of

case is concerned. the salutary provision authorizing
granting of a new trial on a part of the issues only is a
nullity.

It is obvious that by this provision the Legislature

sought to make it possible to facilitate the disposition of
cases of this charac ter and thus save the time of the- court and,
the expense and burden to litigants which necessarily results
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any police

offIcer

may

he may deBlre

and thls-

the fact

no warrant

that

may

been issued, and that the breaking and entering may have beek
done on mere suspicion or conjecture.

These constitutional

provis10ns were adopted to prevent this very evil.
It is indeed regrettable that the majority

ot the

Supreme Court of California has seen fit to perpetuate a rule
which permits peace officers to flout these constitutional
mandates.

This rule was first pronounced by the Supreme Court

of California in People

Vo

Mayen, 188 Cal. 237. which was

followed by the cases of People v. Gonzales, 20 Calo2d 165, and
People v. Kelley. 22 Calo2d 1690

Abuses which have been

practiced under this rule have been declared by the Supreme
I

Court of the United states to be of such gravIty and so

Inhu~n

as to shock the conscience of mankind and that "this course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain ev1dence is bound
to offend even hardened sensibIlities."
California, 342 U.So

1~5o)

(See Rochin

Vo

While the reversal of the Supreme

Court of CalIfornIa by the Supreme Court of- the United states

in the Rochln case was not based upon the Fourth Amendment to
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ConstItut1on

but upon

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to that
Constitution, it cannot be denied that had the courts of
Calitornia

the federal rule wIth respect to excluding

evidence obtained as the result ot an unlawful search and
seizure, the Rochin case would never have occurredo
It cannot be denied that lt lles within the power of
a maJorlty of the Supreme Court of California to change the
rule whlch permitted and encouraged the shocking and inhuman
conduct ot peace officers depicted in the Rochln case.

The

courts of last resort of many other states have seen flt to
adopt and follow the federal rule relatlng to the admlaSibili~Y
of evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and
selzure.
On December 6, 1950, the Supreme Court of Delaware,
in the case of Rickards v. state, overruled two prior decisions

ot that court and adopted the federal rule with respect to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful
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search and seizure; that is, search without a search warrant
decision or the Supreme Court of Delaware is reported in 77
A.2d at page 199.

In the course of its op1nion in this case,

the Supreme Court of Delaware stated:
"Courts rollowing the Federal rule adopt the view that
the efficient prosecution or crindnals cannot justiry a deliberate
invasion ot the rIght of the citizen to be made secure against
violation of specific constitutional guarantees, and that
the suggested remedy of a civil action is as a practical matter
no remedy at allo

The Federal rule 1s a practical attempt to

help preserve the constitutional guarantees
"We prefer the rule followed in the Federal courts.
conceive it the duty of the courts to protect constitutional
guarantees.

The most effective way to protect the guarantees

against unreasonable search and seizure and compulsory selfincrimination is to exclude trom evidence any matter obtained
by a violation of them
t'\ie

believe that as long as the Constitution of this

-'2:7-

We

state contains the guarantees to the citizen referred tO I we
have no choice but to use every means at our disposal to preserve
those guaranteeso

Since it 1s obvious that the exclusion of
protection~

such matters from evidence is the most practical
adopt that means.

we

It is no answer to say that the rule hampers

the task ot the prosecuting officer.

If forced to choose between

convenience to the prosecutor and a deprivation of const1tutional
guarantees to the ci t1zens, \fe in fact have no cho:'..ce

0

n

While 1t 1s my privilege,1t 1s not my pleasure to
write d1ssenting opinions.

I would much preter to concur with

the majority or have them concur 1n opinions prepared by meo
The preparation of a dissent requires extra effort -- 1t 1s an
additional burden and one that I choose to avoid whenever
possible·.

But I believe it to be my solemn duty that when the
-

majority departs from settled rules of law 1n rendering its
decision. to call attention to the error 1n a dissenting
opinion in the hope that the error may be corrected by a
subsequent decision or by the Leg1s1atureo
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A dissenting opInion

also be helpful in cases which are subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States.

The latter court has held

in accord with my dissent and reversed the Supreme Court of
California in several cases in recent years.
I have mentioned only a few of the cases in which I

-

have disagreed with the majority since I have been a member of
Supreme Court of California.

My dissents cover a wide

variety of subjects and speak for themselves.

They present my

view on the proposit1ons of law involved in each of the cases
They are now recorded judicial history.

I have no apology to

offer for any of them, notwithstanding the fact that certain
isolated statements and phrases have been selected from some of
them and criticized as being intemperate by some so-called
eminent authorities.

I claim the privilege of using language

appropriate to the occasIon to express my view and I am not
disposed to permIt even dean emeritus Roscoe Pound of the
Harvard Law School to tell me what language I should use when
depicting the gross injustices which may result from.a majority
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decision o£ the Supreme Court of California.

I might say

ri~ht

here and now that I have failed to find language strong enough
to g1ve expression to

my

views in some cases.

should be equal to the occasion.

The language used

A decision which 1s only a

mild departure from settled principles should not be dealt with
the same as one which outrages Justice and lacks even a
semblance of reason or common sense to support 1 t.

'When the

inimitable Franklin Delano Roosevelt depicted the sneak attack
of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, he declared that that incident
would "live in in£amy,

and when that master of rhetoric and

oratory, Sir WInston Churchill, referred to those brigands,
Hitler and Mussollni. who plunged the world into the worst
holocaust of all time, he used the words "guttersnipe" and
"jackal.

But why belabor the obvious?

If the language used

1s inappropriate it reflects more on the dissenter than on

th~

majority and its value and effect will be appraised by both
contemporary observers and posterity.
Of greater importance than the language used 1n either
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a majority or dissent1ng opin1on 1s the reasoning or philosophy
upon which the op1n1on is based -- what rules of law are
announced -- on which side does justice lie -- or in other
words, who is right?

The answer to th1s question depends upon

one's pOint of view.

I do not claim that I have always been

right.

I may have been wrong many times, but I feel it is my

duty to the people of California to give them the benef1t of
my

opinIon on all major issues which come before the Supreme

Court.

This I have attempted to do.

I claim no credit -- seek

no accla1m or recognition for what I have done or may do 1n
the future

1t 1s my job as I see it, and as long as I have

the physical and mental capacity, I shall continue to
that duty.
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perfor~

